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Abstract—Previous work has demonstrated that the price 
elasticity of the demand side reduces electricity producers’ 
ability to exercise market power. However, price elasticity 
cannot capture alone consumers’ flexibility, as the latter mainly 
involves shifting of loads’ operation in time. This paper provides 
for the first time qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
value of demand shifting in mitigating market power by the 
generation side. An equilibrium programming model of the 
oligopolistic market setting is developed, taking into account the 
inter-temporal characteristics of demand shifting. The decision 
making process of each strategic producer is modelled through a 
bi-level optimization problem, which is solved after 
transforming it to a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium 
Constraints (MPEC). The market equilibria resulting from the 
interaction of multiple independent producers are determined 
by employing an iterative diagonalization method. Case studies 
on a test market with day-ahead horizon and hourly resolution 
quantitatively demonstrate the benefits of demand shifting in 
limiting generation market power, by employing relevant 
indexes from the literature. 
Index Terms--Bi-level optimization, demand shifting, electricity 
markets, equilibrium programming, market power, 
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. 
NOMENCLATURE 
A. Indices 
ݐ  Index of time periods running from 1 to	ܶ 
݅  Index of producers running from 1 to	ܫ 
 
B. Parameters 
݈௜ீ  Price intercept of marginal cost curve of producer ݅ 
(£/MW) 
ݍ௜ீ  Slope of marginal cost curve of producer ݅ (£/MW2) 
݃௜௠௔௫  Maximum power output limit of producer ݅ (MW) 
݈௧஽ Price intercept of marginal benefit curve of demand 
at time period ݐ (£/MW) 
ݍ௧஽ Slope of marginal benefit curve of demand at time 
period ݐ (£/MW2) 
݀௧௠௔௫ Maximum power input limit of baseline demand at 
time period ݐ (MW) 
ߙ  Parameter determining the limit of demand shifting 
 
C. Variables 
݇௜,௧ Strategic offer variable of producer ݅ at time period ݐ  
݇௜ି,௧ Strategic offer variables of producers other than	݅	at 
time period ݐ 
݃௜,௧ Power output of producer ݅ at time period ݐ (MW) 
݀௧ Baseline demand at time period ݐ (MW) 
݀௧௦௛ Change of demand at time period ݐ  due to load 
shifting (MW) 
݀௧ᇱ   Demand at time period ݐ after load shifting (MW) 
ߣ௧  Market clearing price at time period ݐ (£/MWh) 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After the deregulation of the energy sector, electricity 
markets are better described in terms of oligopoly rather than 
perfect competition. In this setting, market participants do not 
necessarily act as price takers. In particular, electricity 
producers controlling a large share of the market are able to 
manipulate the electricity prices and increase their profits 
beyond the competitive equilibrium levels, by virtue of 
strategic offers. This exercise of market power results in loss 
of social welfare and increase in consumers’ payments [1]. 
Previous work investigating the role of the demand side in 
this context has demonstrated that the self-price elasticity of 
demand reduces electricity producers’ ability to exercise 
market power [2]-[7], as demand is reduced at high market 
prices and thus limits the volume of electricity sold by 
strategic producers. A theoretical explanation of this effect is 
presented in [2]-[3]. Authors in [4]-[5] employ a Supply 
Function Equilibrium (SFE) model to determine the oligopoly 
equilibria with different levels of demand’s price elasticity and 
define a number of market power indexes in order to 
quantitatively analyse the impact of elasticity. In [6], the same 
authors model the effect of two demand response programs, 
namely time-of-use (TOU) pricing and economic load 
response program (ELRP), on the price elasticity of demand 
and subsequently assess their impacts on the extent of 
exercised market power. Finally, an agent-based electricity 
market model is employed in [7] to assess the benefits of 
different elasticity levels in limiting market power. 
However, a large number of researchers have stressed that 
demand flexibility regarding electricity use cannot be fully 
captured through the concept of self-price elasticity. Instead of 
simply avoiding using their loads at high price levels, 
consumers are more likely to shift the operation of their loads 
from periods of higher prices to periods of lower prices [2], 
[8]-[11]. In other words, load reduction during certain periods 
is accompanied by a load recovery effect during preceding or 
succeeding periods. Although numerous studies have 
investigated the impacts of this time-shifting flexibility of 
demand [8]-[11] on various aspects of power system operation 
and planning, its role in oligopolistic markets has not been 
investigated yet. 
This paper aims at filling this knowledge gap by providing 
both qualitative and quantitative evidence of the value of 
demand shifting in mitigating market power by the generation 
side. Quantitative analysis is facilitated through a multi-period 
equilibrium programming model of the oligopolistic market 
setting. The decision making process of each strategic 
producer is modelled through a bi-level optimization problem. 
The upper level represents the profit maximization problem of 
the producer and the lower level represents endogenously the 
market clearing process, taking into account the inter-temporal 
characteristics of demand shifting. This bi-level problem is 
solved after transforming it to a Mathematical Program with 
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). The market equilibria 
resulting from the interaction of multiple independent 
producers are determined by employing an iterative 
diagonalization method. Case studies on a test market with 
day-ahead horizon and hourly resolution, quantitatively 
demonstrate the benefits of demand shifting in mitigating 
generators’ market power, resorting to relevant market power 
indexes from the literature [4]-[5]. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II 
outlines models of generation and demand market participants. 
Section III provides a theoretical explanation of the beneficial 
impact of demand shifting on the extent of market power 
exercised by the generation side. Section IV details the 
formulation of the equilibrium programming model for the 
oligopolistic market. Case studies and illustrative results are 
presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes. 
 
II. MODELLING MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
A. Strategic Electricity Producers 
For brevity reasons and without loss of generality, it is 
assumed that each electricity producer ݅  owns a single 
generation unit, the quadratic cost function, linear marginal 
cost function and output limits of which are expressed by (1), 
(2) and (3) respectively: 
ܥ௜,௧൫݃௜,௧൯ = ݈௜ீ ݃௜,௧ + ݍ௜ீ ൫݃௜,௧൯ଶ	 (1)	
ܥ௜,௧ᇱ ൫݃௜,௧൯ = ݈௜ீ + 2ݍ௜ீ ݃௜,௧	 (2)	
0 ≤ ݃௜,௧ ≤ ݃௜௠௔௫, ∀ݐ	 (3) 
The profit of producer ݅ at time period ݐ is then given by: 
ܩ ௜ܲ,௧൫ߣ௧, ݃௜,௧൯ = ߣ௧݃௜,௧ − ܥ௜,௧൫݃௜,௧൯	 (4)	
In line with the majority of relevant works [4], [12]-[15], 
strategic electricity producers are assumed to exert market 
power through submitting offers higher than their actual 
marginal costs (i.e. economic withholding). Following the 
model employed in these papers, the strategic marginal cost 
function is expressed by (5), where the value of the decision 
variable ݇௜,௧ ≥ 1  expresses the extent to which producer ݅ 
misreports its marginal cost at time period ݐ. 
ܵܥ௜,௧ᇱ ൫݃௜,௧൯ = ݇௜,௧(݈௜ீ + 2ݍ௜ீ ݃௜,௧)	 (5) 
݇௜,௧ = 1  stands for perfectly competitive generation 
behavior where producer ݅ reveals its actual marginal cost to 
the market at ݐ, while ݇௜,௧ > 1	represents strategic generation 
behavior where producer ݅  submits higher than its actual 
marginal cost to the market at ݐ. Producer ݅ should decide the 
value of ݇௜,௧  by optimally balancing the trade-off between 
higher market clearing price and lower clearing quantity. 
More specifically, a higher ݇௜,௧  will tend to increase the 
market price at ݐ, but at the same time it will tend to reduce 
the quantity sold by producer ݅, since producers with lower 
submitted marginal costs may replace ݅  in the merit order 
and/or the consumers may employ their self-price elasticity or 
time-shifting flexibility to reduce their demand at ݐ. 
B. Demand Side 
In line with the model employed in [4]-[6], the benefit or 
“usefulness” derived by the demand side at each time period is 
expressed through a quadratic, non-decreasing and concave 
function (6). The marginal benefit is thus expressed through a 
linear decreasing function (7) which encapsulates the effect of 
demand’s self-price elasticity. Consumers’ willingness to pay 
decreases as their consumption increases. The maximum price 
݈௧஽ that the consumers are willing to pay represents the value of 
lost load (VOLL) [7]. The limits in the requested demand 
level at each time period are expressed by (8). The VOLL, the 
slope for the marginal benefit function and the maximum 
demand limit are time-specific parameters, expressing the 
differentiated preferences of consumers across different time 
periods [16]. 
ܤ௧(݀௧) = ݈௧஽݀௧ − ݍ௧஽(݀௧)ଶ (6) 
ܤ௧ᇱ(݀௧) = ݈௧஽ − 2ݍ௧஽݀௧ (7) 
0 ≤ ݀௧ ≤ ݀௧௠௔௫, ∀ݐ (8) 
The time-shifting flexibility of the demand side is 
expressed by (9)-(11). The variable ݀௧௦௛ represents the change 
of the demand with respect to the baseline level ݀௧  at time 
period ݐ  due to load shifting, taking negative values when 
demand is moved away from ݐ  and positive values when 
demand is moved towards ݐ . Constraint (10) ensures that 
demand shifting is energy neutral within the examined time 
horizon i.e. the total size of demand reductions is equal to the 
total size of demand increases (load recovery), assuming that 
temporal shifting of demand does not involve energy gains or 
losses. Constraint (11) expresses the limits of demand change 
at each time period due to load shifting as a ratio ߙ (0 ≤ ߙ ≤
1) of the baseline demand; ߙ = 0 implies that the demand 
side does not exhibit any time-shifting flexibility, while 
ߙ = 1 implies that the whole demand can be shifted in time. 
݀௧ᇱ = ݀௧ + ݀௧௦௛, ∀ݐ	 (9)	
∑ ݀௧௦௛௧ = 0	 (10)	
−ߙ ∗ ݀௧ ≤ ݀௧௦௛ ≤ ߙ ∗ ݀௧, ∀ݐ	 (11)	
The utility of the demand side at time period ݐ is given by 
(12). While the energy payment (second term) depends on the 
final demand after any potential load shifting, the benefit 
(first term) is assumed to depend on the baseline demand; this 
assumption expresses the flexibility of the consumers to shift 
the operation of some of their loads without compromising 
the satisfaction they experience. 
ܦ ௧ܷ(ߣ௧, ݀௧, ݀௧ᇱ) = ܤ௧(݀௧) − ߣ௧݀௧ᇱ	 (12) 
 
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF DEMAND 
SHIFTING ON GENERATION MARKET POWER  
As demonstrated in [8]-[11], the time shifting flexibility of 
the demand side flattens the demand profile by shaving 
demand peaks and filling in off-peak demand valleys. Fig. 1 
illustrates, in a price-quantity graph, the impact of such 
demand shifting on the extent of market power exercised by 
electricity producers, in a simplified market representation 
involving two periods (peak and off-peak). 
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Figure 1.  Illusrtation of mitigation effect of demand shifting on the extent 
of market power exercised by the generation side. 
The two curves represent the cumulative marginal cost 
curves -characterized by increasing slope [1]-[2]- under 
competitive and strategic generation behavior. The price 
intercept and slope of the strategic curve are higher than the 
respective parameters of the competitive curve (Section II-A). 
Demand shifting shaves the peak demand from ݀ଶ to ݀ଶᇱ  and 
increases the off-peak demand from ݀ଵ to ݀ଵᇱ . Market clearing 
prices in the respective cases are obtained by the intersections 
of the marginal cost curves with the vertical demand lines. 
The price increments ∆ߣ indicate the increase of the market 
clearing prices driven by the exercise of market power in the 
respective cases. 
Fig. 1 illustrates that demand shifting reduces the price 
increment at the peak period from ∆ߣଶ  to ∆ߣଶᇱ  while it 
increases it at the off-peak period from ∆ߣଵ to ∆ߣଵᇱ . Although 
the demand shift is energy neutral, i.e. ݀ଶ − ݀ଶᇱ = ݀ଵᇱ − ݀ଵ, the 
price increment reduction at the peak period is higher than its 
increase at the off-peak period, i.e. ∆ߣଶ − ∆ߣଶᇱ > ∆ߣଵᇱ − ∆ߣଵ, 
due to the larger slope of the strategic marginal cost curve. 
This effect also applies to the generation profit increments (as 
quantitatively explored in Section V) and implies that demand 
shifting leads to an overall reduction of the extent of market 
power exerted by the generation side.  
IV. MODELING OLIGOPOLISTIC ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
WITH DEMAND SHIFTING 
A. Decision-Making Problem of Strategic Electricity 
Producers 
Following the approach widely adopted in relevant work 
[4], [12]-[15], the decision making process of each strategic 
electricity producer ݅  is modeled through a bi-level 
optimization problem. The upper level problem determines the 
optimal offering strategies ݇௜,௧  maximizing the producer’s 
profit (13). This problem is subject to the bounds of the 
offering strategies (14) and the lower level problem (15)-(20). 
The latter represents the market clearing process at each time 
period, maximizing the perceived (as strategic producers do 
not necessarily reveal their actual marginal costs to the 
market) social welfare (15), and is subject to power balance 
constraints (16) (the Lagrangian multipliers of which 
constitute the market clearing prices), generation output limits 
(17) and the time-coupling operational constraints of the 
demand side (18)-(20). These two problems are 
interdependent, since the offering decisions made by the 
strategic producer at the upper level problem influence the 
market clearing outcomes in the lower level problem, while 
the market clearing prices and production quantities obtained 
in the lower level problem influence the producer’s profit in 
the upper level problem. 
(Upper level) 
max൛௞೔,೟ൟ ∑ 	ߣ௧݃௜,௧ − ܥ௜,௧൫݃௜,௧൯௧  (13) 
subject to: 
݇௜,௧ ≥ 1	, ∀ݐ (14) 
(Lower level) 
minቄ௚೔,೟,ௗ೟,ௗ೟ೞ೓ቅ ∑ ݇௜,௧ܥ௜,௧൫݃௜,௧൯௧ + ∑ ݇௜ି,௧ܥ௜ି,௧൫݃௜ି,௧൯௜ି,௧ −
∑ ܤ௧(݀௧)௧  (15) 
subject to: 
݀௧ + ݀௧௦௛ − ∑ ݃௜,௧௜ = 0, ∀ݐ (16) 
0 ≤ ݃௜,௧ ≤ ݃௜௠௔௫, ∀݅, ∀ݐ (17) 
0 ≤ ݀௧ ≤ ݀௧௠௔௫, ∀ݐ (18) 
∑ ݀௧௦௛௧ = 0 (19) 
−ߙ ∗ ݀௧ ≤ ݀௧௦௛ ≤ ߙ ∗ ݀௧, ∀ݐ (20) 
In order to solve the above bi-level optimization problem, 
the lower level problem is replaced by its KKT optimality 
conditions, which is enabled by the continuity and convexity 
of the lower level problem. This transforms the bi-level 
problem to a single-level MPEC problem. For space limitation 
reasons, the derivation of the KKT optimality conditions and 
the resulting MPEC formulation are not presented here, but 
they follow the rationale of previous works [12], [14]-[16]. 
B. Determining Oligolistic Market Equilibrium 
The above formulation expresses the decision making 
process of a single electricity producer. In order to determine 
market equilibria resulting from the interaction of multiple 
independent producers, an iterative diagonalization approach 
[4], [12]-[13] is employed in this paper. At each iteration, 
each of the producers solves their MPEC problem -given the 
offering strategies of the rest of the producers as determined 
in the previous iteration- until the offering strategies of all 
producers remain constant with respect to the previous 
iteration. This state corresponds to a market equilibrium since 
none of the producers can increase their profits by unilaterally 
modifying their offering strategies. 
V. CASE STUDIES 
The examined case studies involve demonstration of the 
mitigation effect of demand’s time-shifting flexibility on the 
market power exercised by the generation side in a test market 
with day-ahead horizon and hourly resolution. This market 
includes 7 electricity producers and reflects the general 
generation and demand characteristics of the Great Britain 
(GB) power system [14]. Different scenarios are examined 
regarding the time-shifting flexibility of the demand side, as 
expressed by parameter ߙ. For each of these scenarios, two 
cases have been compared: i) a case of perfectly competitive 
generation behavior (indicated by the superscript ܿ  in the 
remainder), where all producers behave competitively at all 
time periods, i.e. ݇௜,௧ = 1, ∀݅, ∀ݐ, and ii) a case of strategic 
generation behavior (indicated by the superscript ݏ  in the 
remainder), where the offering strategies of the producers are 
determined based on the equilibrium model of Section IV. 
The developed equilibrium programming model has been 
coded and solved using the optimization software FICOTM 
Xpress [17] on a computer with a 6-core 3.47 GHz Intel(R) 
Xeon(R) X5690 processor and 192 GB of RAM. The average 
computational time required for solving a MPEC problem 
was around 8s and the average number of iterations required 
for reaching a market equilibrium has been 16. 
In order to quantify the impact of demand shifting on the 
market power exercised by the generation side, relevant 
indexes from the literature [4]-[5] are applied. The average 
Lerner index (AveLI) (21) expresses the average increase of 
market prices driven by the exercise of market power. Fig. 2 
demonstrates that AveLI is reduced with an increasing 
demand shifting flexibility, implying that the latter limits the 
ability of strategic generation producers to manipulate market 
prices (as also qualitatively illustrated in Section III). 
ܣݒ݁ܮܫ = average௧ ఒ೟
ೞିఒ೟೎
ఒ೟ೞ
		(%)	 (21)		
 
Figure 2.  Averge Lerner index and generation profit deviation index for 
different demand shifting flexibility scenarios 
 
Figure 3.  Cumulative hourly increase of generation profit driven by the 
exercise of market power for different demand shifting flexibility scenarios 
This reduction of the generators’ market power potential 
has also an impact on their additional profit driven by the 
exercise of market power. Fig. 3 presents the cumulative 
increment of the generation side’s hourly profit for different 
scenarios of demand shifting flexibility. Due to the reason 
explained in Section III, demand shifting reduces the hourly 
increase of generation profit during peak hours and increases it 
during off-peak hours, with the former reduction dominating 
the latter increase. This effect becomes more evident as the 
demand shifting flexibility is increased. As a consequence, the 
total generation profit increment driven by the exercise of 
market power is substantially reduced. This reduction is also 
justified by the quantification of the generation profit 
deviation index (GPDI) (22). Fig. 2 demonstrates that GPDI is 
reduced with an increasing demand shifting flexibility, 
implying that the latter reduces the additional generation profit 
driven by the exercise of market power. 
ܩܲܦܫ = ∑ ீ௉೔,೟
ೞ೔,೟ ି∑ ீ௉೔,೟೎೔,೟
∑ ீ௉೔,೟೎೔,೟
	 (%) (22) 
Moreover, the reduction of the generation market power 
has also a beneficial effect on demand side’s utility, which is 
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justified by the quantification of the demand utility deviation 
index (DUDI) (23). Fig. 4 demonstrates that (the absolute 
value of) DUDI is reduced with an increasing demand shifting 
flexibility, suggesting that the latter reduces the demand utility 
decrement driven by the exercise of market power, and thus 
allows consumers to more efficiently secure their economic 
surplus against electricity producers’ gaming behavior.  
ܦܷܦܫ = ∑ ஽௎೟ೞ೟ ି∑ ஽௎೟೎೟∑ ஽௎೟೎೟ 	 (%) (23) 
Finally, the reduction of the generation market power 
potential has also a beneficial impact on social welfare, as 
justified by the quantification of the market inefficiency index 
(MII) (24). Fig. 4 demonstrates that (the absolute value of) 
MII is reduced with an increasing demand shifting flexibility, 
implying that the latter reduces the social welfare loss driven 
by the exercise of market power and thus increases the overall 
efficiency of the market. 
ܯܫܫ = ∑ ௌௐ೟ೞ೟ ି∑ ௌௐ೟೎೟∑ ௌௐ೟೎೟ 	 (%) (24) 
 
Figure 4.  Demand utility deviation index and market inefficiency index for 
different demand shifting flexibility scenarios 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has provided both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence of the value of demand shifting in mitigating market 
power by strategic electricity producers. Qualitative 
explanation of this impact has been performed through a 
simplified two-period example, demonstrating that demand 
shifting reduces the extent of exerted market power at the peak 
period and increases it at the off-peak period, with the former 
reduction being prominently greater than the latter increase 
and leading to an overall positive impact. Quantitative analysis 
has been facilitated through an equilibrium programming 
model of the oligopolistic market setting, taking into account 
the inter-temporal characteristics of demand shifting. 
Case studies with the developed model on a test market 
with day-ahead horizon and hourly resolution have 
quantitatively demonstrated the mitigation effects of demand 
shifting on market power of the generation side, by employing 
relevant indexes from the literature. An increasing demand 
shifting flexibility has been shown to i) reduce strategic 
producers’ ability to manipulate market prices, ii) reduce the 
additional generation profit driven by the exercise of market 
power, iii) protect consumers’ surplus from producers’ 
strategic behavior, and iv) reduce the social welfare loss 
driven by the exercise of market power. 
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